INSURANCE CO. v. STEWART.

opment. The Ufiited States of the Netherlands could pass no law
of importance, except by the unanimous consent of the States
General. A single voice in the ancient Polish Diet could
veto a measure. Does not perhaps something of this sort apply
to our jury unanimity ?
Whether it be so or not, I for one am convinced that we ought
to adopt the other rule in order to give to our verdicts the charActer
of perfect truthfulness, and to prevent the frequent failures Qf
finding a verdict at. all.
I am, with great respect, Dear Sir, your obed't,
FAwoIs LimBRm.
Nnw Yonk, June 26th 1867.

RECENT AMERICAN'DECISIONS.

Circuit Court of United States. District of Xaryland.
JACKSON INSURANCE COMPANY v.JAMES A. STEWART.
-Statutes of .limitation are suspended during a state of war, as to matters in
controversy between citizens of the opbosing belligerents.
This is the rule notwithstanding the statute may have begun to run before the
war.
The late conflict between the United States and the states attempting to secede
was a civil
war, involving the usual consequences and rights of international wars,
and among them the suspension.of the right to sue as between citizens of the.
opposing belligerents, and therefore the suspension of the statutes of limitation.
As regards the state of Tennessee -thewar must be taken to have commencd
after the President's Proclamation of August 16th 1861.
On a recovery by a citizen of Tennessee against a citizen of Maryland after the

close of the war for a debt dua before its commencement, no interest will be allowed
for the period covered by the war.

THIS was an action on a bill of exchange drawn in Memphis, in
February 1861, at sixty days, on James A. Stewart, payable at
the Farmers' and Planters' Bank, in Baltimore, and accepted by
Stewart, but protested for non-payment, April 26th 1861.
Plea-Statute of Limitations.
Replications-ist. That war existed when the cause of action
accrued, and that three years had not elapsed between the close
of the war and the commencement of the suit. 2d. That the
President of the United States declared war against Tennessee,
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by his proclamation of August 16th 1861, which war continued,
until by the proclamation of the President of June 13th 1865,
Tennessee was restored to, the Union ; and that the intervals of
time which elapsed from the maturity of the bill to the beginning
of the warl, and from the close of the war to the commencement
of this suit, did not together amount to three years.
To these replications a general demurrer was filed by defendant.
Geo. W'. Brown and Arthur C. Brown, for plaintiff.
J'ervis Spencer, for defendant.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
GILES, J.-Unquestionably in this case lexfori prevails, and
not lex loci contractus; hence the court will apply the law of
Maryland, which requires suit to be brought within three years,
1 Maryland Code, article lvii., sections 1 and 2.
In this law there are certain specified exceptions provided for,
but it is a mistake to suppose that exceptions may nQt arise other
than those mentioned in the statute. The law always supposes
the existence of a party in being capable of suing ; and if when
the cause of action accrues there is no such party capable of suing,
limitations do not begin to run until such a party comes into
being. Hence if war had existed at the time this cause of action
accrued, limitations would not have begun to run against plaintiff's claim until the war ended.
On the 7th of September 1861, this court decided that the
President of the United States had the right, by proclamation, to
recognise the existence of a state of war; and that the war, from
and after the date of such proclamation, existed between the states
mentioned in the proclamation and the rest of the United States.
Also, that the late war, when so declared and recognised by the
President's proclamation, became a civil war, and imposed upon
both belligerents all the rights and consequences of such a war.
This was one of the earliest decisions in regard to our late civil
war, and the principles there enunciated have since been fully
confirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States in the Prize
Cases, 2 Black 685.
The justices of that court were unanimous as to all the consequences which resulted from a state of civil war, but the three
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dissenting judges were of opinion that the war began only after
the proclamation of the President of August 16th 1861, passed
in pursuance of power conferred upon him by the Act-of July 13th
1861.
.As regards the state of Tennessee, there can be no doubt that
war existed in consequence of the proclamation of the President
of August 16th -1861, and not before, as that state was not
included in the previous proclamations.
It is a well-settled principle that contracts made before war
are only suspended by the war, whereas contracts made during
*ar are void. This principle is fully recognised by the Supreme
C6urt in regard, to our late -civil war.
In ancient times private property of alien enemies, and debts
of every kind, were confiscated to the state' Happily all this
has been changed in modern times; and now, while contracts
made during war between alien enemies are absolutely void, being
against public policy, private interests are protected, and. bond
fide contracts, made before the breaking out of a war, are sus
pended during its existence, but revive at its termination. To
the honor of the United States and Great Britain be it said that
these rights.have always been respected by them.
It has been repeatedly decided by both State and Federal
Courts that where, by a legislative enactment, parties are prevented from prosecuting their claims, the interval during which
such prevention lasts is not to be counted as part .of the time.
allowed by the Statute of Limitations. Now, the power to make"
war and peace is by-the Constitution of the United States delegated exclusively to the Federal Government; and as during the
war-the plaintiff, being a corporation of the'state of Tennessee,
'had no right to bring suit against the defendant, who was a citizea
of Maryland, the Maryland Statute of Limitations was suspended
during such period.
The general rule unquestionably is that where the Statute of
Limitations has once begun to run no subsequent disability wll
arrest it. But we have already seen that a legislative enactment
suspends the running of the statute,' and the same result follows
from the declaration of war by the supreme power of the land.
For it is a well-recognised principle of the law of nations that
the right of a creditor to sue for the recovery of 'his debt is not
extinguished by the war, it is only suspended during the war, and
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revives in fall force on the restoration of peace.- A war then
certainly existed between Tennessee and the Federal Government, from the -President's proclamation of August 16th 1861,
and although a civil war, yet, according to the decision of
the Supreme Court in the Prize Cases, it carried with it all
the consequences and disabilities of a public war, one of which
(as we have seen) was the suspension of the right to sue during
the war. It follows, therefore, that the plaintiff in this case could
have instituted no proceedings in this court until peace was proclaimed by the President's proclamation of June 13th 1865.
This suspension being by the exercise of the paramount authority
of the Government, cannot be held to work a forfeiture of the
plaintiff's cause of action; but that his right to sue, suspended
by the war; revived when it ceased. And as it has not been three
years from the maturity of the cause of action to the commencement of the war, and from the termination of the war to the commencement of this suit, this suit is not barred by limitation, and
the demurrer is therefore overruled.
The case being then, by agreement, submitted to the court,
judgment is entered for the full amount of the plaintiff's claim,
together with interest from the 26th of April 1861 to the 16th
of August 1861, and from the 18th of June 1865 to date, no
interest being allowed for the time during which the war lasted.
The foregoing opinion, although not
containing anything of particular novelty, in presenting familiar rules.of law,
as applicable to alien enemies, is one of
some interest, at this particular time, in
its application to contracts made with
the residents in the states where the rebellion extended, both before and during
the existence of the controversy.
We have had no leisure to consider
the points with much care, but their obvious reasonableness, justice, and practical character seem to present them in
such a light as to preclude all doubt of
their soundness. The authorities cited
by the plaintiff's counsel in the argument of this case upon the point that
the existence of war suspends the operation of the Statute of Limitations so
long as the war continues, inasmuch as

the remedy is thereby suspended, seem
very fully to sustain the proposition :
Wall v. Robson, 2 Nott & MlcCord 498;
Moses v. Jones, Id. 259 ; Nicks v. Martindale, Harper (S. C.) 138; Ogden v.
Blackledge, 2 Cranch 272 ; opkirk v.
Bdl, 3 Id. 54. Indeed we are not
aware that the question really admits
of much controversy, as applicable to
international wars. And since the late
civil conflict practically interrupted all
intercourse and all commerce between
the different, sections, we see no ground
upon which, in this respect, any distinction should be made between this and
international wars, so long as there
existed an actual non-intercourse and a
practical impossibility of enforcing the
claim.
I. F. R.
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Common .Plea8 of New York.
JAMES McBRIDE v. JAMES A. DORMAN.
A party who gives up to his debtor his iote or check past due and dishonored,
for the notetor check of a third person, is not in the same posi ion as before the
transaction, and is therefore a holder for value of the check received.
Where a person, in consideration of receiving from his debtor.the note of a third
person, gives up a note of his debtor which is past due, it is equivalent to an
agreement on his part to cancel the bxisting indebtedness and to rely thereafter
upon the obligation which he has taken in its stead.
• It seems that the declarations of one who assigns his property for the benefit of
his.creditors, made prior to the assignment, are evidende against the assignee.

TnIS action was brought by the assignee of the firm of Miles
&. Bartlett, to recover $2000 paid by his assignors to take up a
note which they had nmade for the defendant's accommodation,
and which the latter had neglected to pay.
-The answer admitted the claim, but pleaded by way of set-off,
that Miles & Bartlett were indebted to the defendant at the time
of the assignment for 53400, had and received by them of him.
The plaintiff's testimony was in substance as follows
Miles & Bartlett, Dorman, and the firm of A. L. Searing & Co.,
of which firm Mr. Tompkins was a member, were all in 1859
engaged in the business of buying and" selling live and dressed
hogs. Dorman had desk-room in Sear.ing's office, and Tompkins
was Dorman's clerk. He was in the habit of delivering to Tompkins checks signed by him in blank. One of thes6 checks, for
$3400, was made payable to Miles & Bartlett. Dorman learned
of its issue the day after its date, found that it overdrew his bank
account, immediately went about getting money to take it up,
obtained the amount to within $200 or $300,.paid it to Miles &
Bartlett, gave them his check for the balance, and took up the
check in question on or about December 22d 1859. Afterwardw
Dorman was informed by Miles'or Bartlett that they had receivea
this check from Tompkins for a check of A. L. Searing & Co.'I
which had been dishonored.
Bartlett testified that he had no notice of any limitation on
Tompkins's authority to fIll up checks for Dorman.
It did not appear that Dorman ever notified the plaintiff or
Miles & Bartlett that he was dissatisfied with Tompkins's course
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in the matter. Searing & Co. were solvent at the time. $2150.38
of the $3400 paid by the defendant, was in a check of theirs.
The plaintiff asked the court to instruct the jury to find a verdict in his favor ; the judge refused, and to his refusal there was
an exception.
There was testimony for the plaintiff as to the consideration of
the check in question, conflicting with that before stated.
The verdict was for the defendant. From the judgment entered thereon the plaintiff appealed to the General Term of the
court.
Eierett P. Wheeler, for plaintiff.-The defendant seeks to set
off a claim for money paid under a mistake to Miles & Bartlett.
To do this he must prove the mistake; that Mileg & Bartlett had
no legal right tojcollect the money; and in cases like the present,
that he proceeded promptly to disaffirm the acts of his agent, and
returned whatever that agent had received in the course of the
transaction, from the parties with whom he dealt. The respondent
failed to establish any one of these points.
1. He has not 'shown that the check for $3400 which he lpaid
was not given in payment of a debt which he owed, or for some
other valuable consideration. He testifies only to admissions-of
Miles or Bartlett "that they got-that check from Tompkins for a
check of A. L. Searing & Co. which had been dishonored."
The declarations or admissions of Miles & Bartlett were not
evidence against their assignee, the plaintiff: Foster v. Beals, 21
N. Y. 247 ; Paige v. Cagwin, 7 Hill 361 Smith v. Web, I
Barb. S. C R. 230; Cuyler v. MoCartney, 33 Id. i65; Jones
v. Methodist Church, 21 Id. 161, 174.
2. Miles & Bartlett were bond fide holders for value of the
defendant's check.
a. The presumption is in their favor. They were holders-of
negotiable paper.
b. Their good faith is not impeached. Mere absence of care
and caution inreceiving negotiable paper-is not enough to affect
the holder's title. "We have shaken off the last vestige of a
contrary doctrine :" Steinhart v. Boker, 34 Barb. 436,; Goodman, v. Simmonds, 2 How. U. S. Rep. 343, 363; Baphael v.
Bank of England, 33 Eng. L. & Eq. 276; s. c. 17 C.B. 161";
Murray v. Lardner, 2 Wallace 110.
VnT.. XV.-47
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e. Miles & Bartlett were holders for value of the defendant's
check. There is no indication that the check of the latter was
received as collateral only. On the contrary, the check, the
proper and sole evidence of-the debt, was'delivered up. That
the parties meant to extinguish the subsisting debt is thus rendered evident.
An exchange of negotiable paper makes the holders of the
paper exchanged holders for value. It *is immaterial whether
the maker of the note received turns out to be insolvent: Byles
on Bills 95; Bice v. .Mather, 3 Wend. 62; .ffornbtower v. Proud,
2 B. & Ald, 327; Whittier v. Eager, 1 Allen 499; Troy City
Bank v. MeSpedon, 33 Barb. 81.
d. A person who receives negotiable paper in payment of a
.check which he at the time delivers up, is a holder for value of
the paper received. If the defendant is allowe4 to repudiate his
payment, the plaintiff is not put in possession of the check of
Searing & Co. which he held beyond their control, and which
was presumptive evidence in the hands of Miles & Bartlett of a
debt due from the Searings: Young v.'Lee, 12 N. Y. (2 Kern.)
552; Stellheimer v. Meyer, 33, Barb. 215; Bank of Sandusky
v. Scovell, 24 Wend. 115; Bank of Salina v. Babcock, 21 Id.
499; White v. Springfield Bank, 3 Sandf. S. C. R. 522; N. Y.
NarbZe and Iron Woriks v. Smith, 4 Duer 362; 1 Parsons on
Bills 221, 222.
3. The rule that where, of two innocent parties, one must suffer
by a fraud, the one who has enabled the guilty party to commit
the fraud must bear the loss, is applicable to a case like this: 2
Term R. 70. The signing the check in blank was an authority
to Tompkins to fill it up to any amount: Schultz v. Aetley, 2
Bing. N. C. 544; Triolett v. Patten, 5 Cranch 147. Tompkins
in filling up Dorman's check claimed to act as his agent. Thn
defendant was bound to act- promptly if he intended to disaffirm
his act. His neglect to do so, and especially his payment of the
balance of the $3400 on the 30th of December, nine days after
the transaction in question, amounted to an aflirmance. Had: he
acted promptlyl Miles & Bartlett might have secured themselves
as against Tompkins and Searing & Co.: Story on Agency,
.§§ 256, 258; Cairns v. Bleecker, 12 Johns. 300.
4. A party who claims to repudiate a transaction on the ground
of fraud, must return whatever has been received by him in the
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transaction: Stbry on Agency, § 250; Baker v. Bobbins, 2
Denio 136.
Clarkson N. Potter, for the respondent.-First. The case was
properly submitted to the jury.
I. Defendant's statement, if believed, constituted a perfect defence ; and Bartlett's declarations, to which defendant testified,
were properly received in evidence.
Because the declaration of an insolvent assignor as to the
validity of one of the assigned debts made before the assignment,
is always evidence against the assignee: Willis v. Farley, 3
Car. & P. 895; approved, Adams v. Davidson, 10L N. Y. 318.
And the cases to the contrary have since been overruled: Schenck
v. Warner,, 87 Barb. 261, 268. And it matters not that the
assignor was still alive: Beach v. Wise, 1 Hill 638.
II. But even if Bartlett's declaration had not been excluded,
the case should still have been left to the-jury.
For it appeared by all the testimony that unless Dorman exchanged checks as alleged-with Miles & Bartlett (the insolvent
assignors of the plaintiff), he never received any value for his
$38400 check, and was entitled to counterclaim for it. Plaintiff's
witnesses insisted that there was such an exchange, and did not
pretend that any other value was given for Dorman's check.
Defendant positively denied this exchange; and declared that he
left this and other checks of his with his book-keeper, signed in
blank to be filled up by-his book-keeper in payment for certain
purchases of hogs, as the bills were presented for the same; and
that the book-keeper had fraudulently filled up this check and
issued it to Miles & Bartlett without authority or value to him,
and as he learned from his book-keeper as well-as from Bartlett,
in exchange of an old-debt of his book-keeper's.
III. No proof that Miles & Bartlett had notice of Tompkins's
fraud when they took the check, was necessary.
No other value for the check, except the alleged exchange,
was pretended. If Miles & Bartlett did not get it upon such an
exchange, they never gave nor indicated that they gave any value
for it. And Tompkins having issued the check without any
authority, Miles & Bartlett could not hold it, even if they had no
notice of such want of authority, since they took the check with-
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out parting with value for it. And the Searing & Co. check
given to Tompkins was not valuea. Because it was dishonored at the time.
b. Because it was itself given for a debt past due which was
not extinguished by the dishonored check, and. which, unless
extinguished by defendant's check, still subsists.
DALY, F. J.-It was shown on the part of the plaintiff that
Miles & Bartlett's note for $2000 was made by them, for the
defendant's accommodation; that he agreed to pay it, but they were
obliged to pay it at maturity. Upon this state of facts the plaintiff was entitled to recover, unless the defendant established a
counter-claim. The proof on the part of the defendant in respect
to the counter-claim was substantially this. That he was in the
habit of signing checks in blank to be filled up by Tompkins, who
was his book-keeper, for hogs purchased upon the defendant's
account ; that Tompkins without authority filled up a blank check
for $3400, and gave it to Miles &Bartlett for a check of A. L.
Searing & Co., of which.firm Tompkins was a member; that the
defendant paid this check of $3400 to Miles & Bartlett without
knowing from whom they obtained it, or for what it was given,
and that he afterwards learned from Bartlett, that they got it from
Tompkins for a check of A. L. Searing & Co., which had been
dishonored; the defendant therefore claimed that as this check
had been diverted by Tompkins to a different purpose from that
which the defendant intended when he signed it in blank, as he
'paid the full amount of it to Miles & Bartlett, without knowledge
of the circumstances, and, as they gave no value for it, but received it in exchange for a dishonoured check, that he was
entitled to off-set the amount paid under such circumstances,
against the amount paid by Miles & Bartlett, to take up the note
which they had made for the defendant's accommodation.
At the time of the trial Miles was dead, but the surviving partner Bartlett was examined, and testified that the $3400 was taken
up by the firm in exchange for a check of the same amount, which
they made at the defendant's request, and which he gave to Tompkins ; which check was produced at the trial, and had upon it a
mark of the bank indicating that it had been paid. Bartlett
denied that he ever told the defendant that his firm got the $3400
check for a dishonored check of A. L. Searing & Co., and
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declared that he never had had a check of theirs, which had been
dishonored, nor any trouble with them about their checks: This
was directly contradicting the account which the defendant gave
of this transaction, and was corroborated by the production of the
check of Miles & Bartlett, dated the day after the date of the
defendants' check, for the same amount $8400, with a mark indicating that it had been paid. But the conflict was wholly immaterial, for upon the defendant's own showing, Miles & Bartlett
were holders of the $3400 for value; for if they surrendered and
gave up for it the evidence of an indebtedness on the part of A.
L. Searing & Co. to them, that was sufficient to constitute them
holders for value.
Stellheimer v. Meyer, 38 Barb. 215; Touney v. Lee, 18 Id.
187, 12 N. Y. 551 It was held. in the first if these cases that
when a negotiable note is taken in good faith before it becomes
due, in payment and satisfaction, of a pre-existing indebtedness,
and the evidence of such indebtedness is at the same time surrendered or destroyed, the person taking the note is a holder for a
valuable consideration. In that case the evidence of indebtedness,
which was given up, was a due-bill which was then past due and
dishonored.
In Cardwell v. Hicks, 37 Barb. 465, the correctness of the
decision was questioned by Mr. Justice LEONARD, who seems to
have thought that it was decided upon the ground that the decision of the Court of Appeals in Tounqy v. Lee, supra, had overturned the cases of Coddington v. Bay, 20 Johns. 637, rosa v.
Bartherson, 10 Wend. 86, and Stalker v. McDonald, 6 Hill 98.
Touney v. Lee has not overturned'the authority of these cases,
nor do I find anything in the opinion of Justice JOHNSON in
Stelleimer v. Mteyer, warranting the conclusion that that case
was decided upon any such ground. It was not necessary to do
so, for all that was ever decided in the three cases above referred
to was that a party is not a holder for value, who receives the
note of a third person for an existing debt under circumstances
which show that he took it merely as security and not as a substitute for and in extinguishment of the original indebtedness.
Chancellor KENT, whose opinion was affirmed in Coddington v.
Bay, points to the fact that the notes in that suit were not taken
in payment of an existing debt: 5 Johns. Ch.. R. 57 ; and Chief
Justice SPENCER, in his opinion in the Court of Errors, calls
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attention to the circumstance that there was no proof that the
parties who took the note had lost the benefit of any other security, and thlat as respects the original indebtedness their situation
was exactly the same as if the notes had not been transferred to
them. Chief Justice SAVAGE, in Rosa v. Bartherson, cited and
illustrated the remark of Chief Justice SPENCER that all the
cases cited in the argument of Ooddington v. Bay were those
where notes or bills were taken in the usual course of trade and
for a present consideration paid, and not where they were received
as security for an antecedent debt. Justice BEARDSLEY regarded
the case as adjudging that one who receives negotiable paper in
payment of a pre-existing debt, is not a holder for value. But
as I understand the facts in the case, the note was merely received
nominally in payment of a pre-existing debt, for the decision is
put upon the ground that the plaintiff could lose nothing, as he
gave nothing for the note, and had therefore no equity superior
to that of the maker. If the case goes beyond this, which I think
it does not, then, as Justice BEARDSLEY remarked, it has been
overruled by later decisions in this state: Scott v. Betts, Lalor's
Rep. 363.
In Stalker v. McDonald, supra, Senator LoTT, who gave one
of the two opinions delivered, relies upon the circumstance that
there was no stipulation or agreement on the, part of Stalker,
upon withdrawing the note of Gillespie & Edwards from the bank,
that he would not enforce the payment of it, and it 'distinctly
appeared upon the trial, and was so found by the jury, that
Stalker merely received the note of the plaintiff from Gillespie &
Edwards as collateral security for the payment of their note.
The doctrine laid down by Chancellor WALLWORTH, who gave

the other opinion, is that a bond fide holder of negotiable paper
is one who has paid value for it or who has relinquished some
available security or valuabl. right on the credit thereof, and not
one who has received it for an antecedent debt, either as a nominal payment or as security for payment, without .giving up any
security for the debt which he previously had or giving any new
consideration.
The point determined in Stellheimer v. Afeyer, that one who
receives the note of a third person in satisfaction of an existing
debt, and gives up the evidence of the previous indebtedness, is
a holder for value, did not and could not arise in Stalker v.
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McDonald. The exact limit and nature of that decision is succinctly stated by Judge DuER in WThite v. The Springfield Bank.
"The only question," he says, " that was discussed by the counsel,
or which could properly arise upon the facts, was whether the
court should adhere to the decision of Coddington v. Bayj, or
renounce its authority in deference to the judgment of the
Supreme Court of the United States in Swift v. Tyron, 16
Peters I. There was no question as to the effect of a transfer
intended to operate and actually operating as a payment of a
precedent debt. The notes in controversy had been transferred
to the plaintiff in error, not for the purpose of then satisfying
but as collateral security for the eventual payment of an existing
debt, he retaining in his hands the evidence of the debt, and
never for any point of time relinquishing the right or losing the
power of enforcing its payment." "If," said Justice BEARDSLEY
in Scott v. Betts, Lalor's Rep. 870, " the paper is received in
payment and satisfaction of an existing debt, or if in consideration of its transfer some new responsibility is incurred or a valuable benefit relinquished by the person who receives it, he ought
in my judgment on every, principle to be deemed a purchaser for
value. A debt which ought to be paid is cancelled by the creditor, a new burthen is assumed, and some valuable advantage is
given up. Where in reason and justice can be the difference
between a purchaser in one of these modes, or by a present pay,
ment of money ?" The principle which pervades all the cases,
from Butler v. -Harrison
, Cowp. Rep. 565, downward, is that
where the party remains in respect to the original indebtedness,
in exactly the same position as he was before, he shall not be
deemed a holder for value; and adopting this as the test, and I
think it is the true one, a party who gives up to his debtor his
note or check past due, for the note, or check of a third person,
is not in the same position as he was before, as he has parted with
a written acknowledgment of the indebtedness which is presumptive evidence of its existence. He gives up a benefit or advantage, for it may be that the instrument is the only means by
which he could prove the fact of the original indebtedness.
Justice ALLEN, in Farringtonv. The Frankfort Bank, 24 Barb.
567, after an elaborate review of nearly all the authorities in this
state, up to that time (1857), said in respect to the case beforo
him: "The defendants are in as good a situation, if they are
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compelled to surrender the bill indorsed by the plaintiff, as they
would have been if they had never taken them-they parted with
nothing ;" plainly evincing in his mind that was the test. Where
a party, in consideration of receiving from his debtor the note of
a third person, gives up a note of his debtor which is past due, it
must be regarded as equivalent to an agreement on his part to,
cancel the existing indebtedness, and to rely thereafter upon the
obligation which he has taken in its stead. In The Mohawk Bank
v. Corey/, 1-Hill 513, the notes which were given up by the bank
for the note of the defendant, were past due and had been sued
upon, and Chief Justice BRONSON held that -even if the note of the
defendant- had beeni diverted from its proper use, the- bank had
given a valuable consideration for it and were entitled to recover.
In Young v. Lee, supra, and in White v. The S'pringfield Bank,
supra, the paper given up was not yet due, but the case above
quoted shows that that makes no difference, yet that it is the
ground upon which Justice LEONARD relies as distinguishing the
decision of the Court of Appeals in Young v. Lee from the case
of Stellheimer v. Meyer. He has not, however, pointed out any
reason why that should make a difference. Justice JOHNSON, in
Stellheimer v. Meyer, was of the opinion that that could make
no difference in principle, as was also Justice INGRAHAM, who
delivered an opinion dissenting from that of Justice LEONARD in
Card4oell v. Hicks, and in their view upon that point I fully
concur. If the note given up is wholly worthless by !he reason
of the insolvency of the maker or otherwise, there would be some
reason for holding that nothing of value had been parted with,
but that is not the case here, for it was distinctly proved and not
contradicted by the defendant that he paid the $8400 check to
Miles & Bartlett, by a payment of $118 in cash and four checks,
one of which was a check of this very firm of A. L. Searing &
Co., showing that at that time their check was equivalent to cash
and that they were responsible persons.
BRADY, J., concurred.

CARDOZO, J.-Upon the authority of Brown v. Leavitt, 31'N.
Y. 113, I consider that I erred in refusing to charge that the
plaintiff was a holder for value and absolutely entitled to recover,
and therefore I concur that the judgment should be reveised and
a new trial ordered.
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The case of 1fagee v. Badger, 34 N.
Y. 247, may be added to the authorities
cited under the plaintiffs second point
as to the presumption in favor of the
holder of negotiable paper.
The court on the argument intimated
an opinion that the plaintiff's first point
was not well taken, and CAnDOZO, J.,
on the second trial received in evidence
the admissions of the plaintiff's assignors against his objection. It is submitted that Cuyler v. McCartney, 33
Barb. r65, Jones v. Methodist Church,
21 Id. 161, 174, are at variance with
this ruling at Nisi Prius. In New York
the assignee for the benefit of creditors
can bring an action to set aside a fraudulent conveyance previously made by his
assignor-: Laws 1858, ch. 314. (Though
this was probably otherwise before the
statute : Van Heusen v. Radcliff, 17 N.
Y. 580.) In Piccett v. Leonard, 34 N.
Y. 75, it was held that a payment by an
assignee under an insolvent assignment
of part-of a debt does not operate to take
a case out of the Statute of Limitations.
The assignee is primarily trustee for the
creditors, and it is difficult to perceive
any gqod reason for allowing the assignor to cut down their rights by-his
admissions.
The cases cited in the points show
that the courts of New York have gone
farther in excluding evidence of the admissions of assignors, in suits brought
by the assignee, than the rule stated in
I Grecnl. Ev. § 190 would justify. It was, however, held in Adams v.
Davidson, 10 N. Y. 309, that admissions
of the assignor of merchandise, made
while in the actual possession of it, were
evidence against the-assignee. But this
was put on the ground that they qualified and showed the character of his
possession. They were part of the res
gestw.
It is not easy to reconcile Fosterv.

Beals, 21 N. Y. 247, with Jermain v.
Denniston, 6 N. Y. (2 Seld.) 276. In
the former a receipt in the handwriting
of a mortgagee, dated before the mortgagor had notice of an assignment, was
held inadmissible as against the assignee.
In the latter, entries on the pass-book
of a bank of payments on account of a
note owned by it, were held admissible
against its subsequent indorsee. The
court put this -on the ground that the
entries were acts of the holder, and not
mere admissions. It is true that in
Poster v. Beals there was no evidence
except the date, of the time when the
receipt was given, and there were some
suspicious circumstances attending the
transaction. The court in Jermain v.
Denniston did not hold that the date of
the entry was primd facie evidence of
the time it was made, although RU G-.
LErs, C. J., said that in the absence of
suspicious circumstances it ought to be
so considered. It is, we think, safe to
say that under these decisions and those
cited in the points, the rule in New York
is that mere admissions of an assignor,
even though made prior to the assignment, are not evidence against his assignee for value; but if the admission
offered amounts to an act binding on
him and on the party to whom it was
made, and altering the relation between
them, it is admissible in evidence against
the assignee if shown by extrinsic evidence to have been made prior to the.
assignment.
hether its date, if it be
in writing, is yrimd facie evidence of
this time, is, we think, still undecided.
The admissions in the principal case
were parol statements, not acted on,
and not qualifying any actual possession. Unless the assignee is identical
in interest with the assignor (see I
Greeni. Ev. § 180), it would seem that
they should have been excluded.
E. P. W.
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Supreme Court of .New York.
JOSEPH W. WALTER v. THE PEOPLE OF NEW YORK.'
Force is a necessary element of the crime of rape, and the degree of force used
in ordinary sexual intercourse is not sufficient to constitute the crime.
The woman's consent to the intercourse, even though obtained by fraud, prevents the act from being rape, unless the evidence shows that the man intended to,
use force if his fraud failed.
Where a physician had carnal connection with a woman of infirm mind (but not
imbecile) 'without resistance, but upon the pretence that he was treating her pro-

fessionally for a disease of the womb, a conviction for .rape was quashed.
THE plaintiff *inerror was convicted of rape under the 2d subdivision of Section 22,,Art. 2, chap. 1, part 4, R. S., which reads
as follows:-1" By forcibly ravishing any woman of the age of ten
years or upwards."
The indictment contained but one count, and -was in the ordinary form.
It appeared by the evidence that the complainant was of weak
mind, but not'imbecile. She was thirty years old. The plaintiff
in error was a physician, and at the'time of the commission of the
offence, was, and for some time prior thereto, had been treating
her medically.
The doctor was called in to treat her for a temporary complaint,
and after she had recovered from that she informed him of her
more serious indisposition. He then informed her that she had
womb disease, and that he would have to make an examination of
her person to inform himself of the nature of her disease. She at
first objected to the examination; but he informed her that "it
was absolutely necessary that she should undergo such examina
tion-it could not be avoided," whereupon she consented.
The prosecutrix testified that under pretence of such examination defendant had connection with her, that she did not know
that what he did was anything more than a medical examination.
She had no knowledge on the subject, and only became aware of
the nature of the act on being confined. The other facts appear
in the opinion.'
IWe are indebted for this case to the courtesy of N. Millard, Esq.-ED.
A. L. R.
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N. Millard, for plaintiff in error.-1. Having connection with
a woman by fraud, and without the intention to use forc6 if the
fraud fails, is not sufficient to constitute rape: Rex v. Jackson,
1 British Crown Cases, Russel and Ryan 487; Regina v. Sanders, 34 E. 0. L. R. 725 (8 Carr. & P. 264); Regina v.
Williams, Id. 737; Regina v. Case, 1 Eng. L. & Eq. 544;
Regina v. Clark, 29 Id. 542; The Queen v. Fletcher, Law Rep. 1 Cr. Cases 39; Lewis v. State, 30 Ala. 54; Commonwealth v. Field, 4 Leigh 648; Charles v. State, 6 Eng. (Ark.)
389; Pleasant v. State, 8 Eng. 360; People v. Barton, 1
Wheeler's Criminal Cases 378; State'v. Shepard, 7 Conn. 54;
Wyatt v. State, 2 Swan 394.
2. It must appear that there was the utmost resistance on the
part of the woman the moment she discovered the nature of the
act, and this being wanting, she consents, and there is no rape:
People v. Morrisson, 1 Parker's Cr. Rep. 625; Woodin v.
People, Id. 464 ; Wyatt v. State, 2 Swann 394.
3. The plaintiff in error cannot be convicted of an assault to
commit a rape nor of a common assault.
To constitute an assault there must be an intention of using
actual violence against the person (The People v. Hfays, 1 Hill
351 ; The People v. Bransby, 5 Tiffany 82) ; and a criminal conviction for an assault cannot be upheld when no battery has been
committed, attempted, intended, nor threatened by the party
accused (Id. 532) and it is indispensable to the offence that violence
to the person be either offered, menaced, or designed (Id.), and
there is no exception to this rule in case of an indignity offered to
a female when she is a consenting party to an act involving herown dishonor (Id. and head note, 525).
S. .D. Morris, District Attorney, for the People.-The main
question is whether fraud, in such a case as this, is not equivalent
to force, requisite to constitute the offence of rape.
The elements of fear and force enter to a certain extent in the
case. The force, necessary to copulation, and the fear, superinduced by a belief that health could not otherwise be restored.
The case, however, mainly turns upon the question of passive
non-resistance, superinduced by fraud.
1. " The original doctrine, that it was necessary that the act

WALTER v. THE PEOPLE.

should be against the woman's will, may now be considered as
so fir modified as to make it sufficient to constitute the offence,
that it should have been committed without her consent. The
original position, it is true, remains unshaken, that carnal knowledge of a woman against her willi is rape: 1 Hawk. C. 41, S. 6.
But there are cases where the will may remain passive, or may
even concur in the ultimate act, in which nevertheless rape is held
to be complete."
Where the woman is insensible, through fright, or even where
she consents when under fear of death or duress, the consummated
act is rape: Wharton, Am. Grim. Law, § 1142 ; Dalt. c. 105, 607 ;
1 Hawk. P. C. Ca. 41; Wharton & Stilld, Med. Jur. § 438;
Pleasantv. State, 8 Eng. (8 Ark.) 360.
A person who obtains possession of a female by putting her in
fear by threats, is clearly guilty of rape ; yet, the construction
contended for, would render him liable to assault and battery
only ; no such force being used as is insisted upon to be necessary
to constitute rape. The 25th section of the statute does not
meet the case-the offence under that section involves abduction
as one of the elements of the crime.
It is insisted that passive non-resistance produced by fraud, ia
precisely the same in law as passiye non-resistance effected through
fear.
It is true that it was held by the Recorder in the case of The
People v. Barton, 1 Wheeler's C. 0. 881, after a good deal of
hesitation, that fraud without force was not sufficient.
But in that very case the counsel referred to a case decided in
the same court, Mayor Golden presiding, in which he held that
"if the defendant had succeeded in deceiving the woman and
accomplishing his purpose, he would have been guilty of a
rape."
A note at the end of this case says: "Since this trial, we
have been informed that Chief Justice THOMPSON at a Court of

Oyer and Terminer, in Albany, a few months .previous to his
leaving the bench, ruled that force was not necessary to the commission of a rape; but that stratagem might be tried to supply its
place; and in a case of similar character, so charged the jury."
In Begina v. Case, 1 Eng. L. & Eq. 544, "it was held that
a physician was properly convicted of assault and battery in
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debauching a girl of fourteen, who did not assent to carnal connection, but made no resistance to his act, from a bond fide belief
that he was, as he represented, treating her medically for her disorder. The judges sustained the conviction, on the distinction
between actual assent to sexual intercourse, and acquiescence by
passive non-resistance, in an act of the physician of the nature
of which she was ignorant."
In the case of Th e People v. Barnsby, 32 N. Y. 532, Judge
PORTER concedes the point (practically) that stratagem and fraud
supplies the place of force where the party confides in the good
faith of the representations of a medical man.
2. The same principle has been repeatedly asserted, where the
fraud has been practised upon married women, under circumstances leading them to suppose it was the act .of the husband.
People v. Metcalf, 1 Wheel. C. C. 878; tate v. Sephard, t
Conn. 54. The same principle was also held by TnomsoN, C. J.
See Wharton, A. C. L., § 1144.
By the Court, GILBERT, T.-The plaintiff in error has been convicted of the crime of rape, and is now imprisoned in the state's
prison under a sentence upon that conviction. The case is before
us upon a bill of exceptions.
The plaintiff in error is a physician. The prosecutrix is a single
woman, thirty years of age. The commission of the offence rests
upon her testimony alone. Her evidence briefly stated is, that the
plaintiff in error, while attending her in a professional capacity,told her that she had a disease of the womb, and that a physical
examination was necessary; that she submitted with much reIuctance; that he had carnal connection with her on two occasions
while professing to be making such examination; that 'this occurred in the parlor of her brother's house, in the daytime, while
the wife of her brother was in an adjoining room; that she made
no outry,-that she believed that while the plaintiff in error was
doing these acts, he was making a medical examination in the
usual way, and that she made no revelation of these occurrences
until after she had been told that she was pregnant.
No one, we think, would seriously contend, that such a statement, made by a female of mature age, and possessing any intellectual capacity, ought to be allowed to become the basis of judicial action. The effort of the prosecution, therefore, was to' show
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that the mental'condition of the prosecutrix was such as to render
her testimony credible. This effort failed.
The only testimony on this point came from Dr. Stickney, who
had known her twenty, years. He testified that "she is not
an imbecile, but not a smart or strong-minded girl." Further
comment on the facts is unnecessary.
The coirt among other points charged the jury as follows: "As
to the degree of force used in a case like this, where resistance is
not made by reason of a representation leading the female to
believe that sexual penetration of her 1tody is necessary for her
recovery from disease, the force used in ordinary sexual intercourse is sufflcient to constitute a rape." An exception'was taken
to this part of the charge. The prisoner's counsel requested the
court to charge several propositions, presenting the point that the
force requisite to constitute the crime of rape had not been proved,
and also this proposition, namely, that "even if the defendant had
accomplished his alleged purpose by fraud, without intending to
use force, then such fraud does not constitute rape, unless the
evidence shows that the defendant intended to, use force if the
fraud failed;" but the court refused to modify the charge, and the
prisoner's counsel excepted.
We are U opinion that the propositioir quoted from the charge
is erroneous. No authority has been cited sustaining such a proposition. The remark of Mr. Wharton in his Treatis e,§ 1144,
cannot be regarded as having the sanction of his learning and
-ability. It rests upon no other foundation than a note of the
reporter in 1 Wheel. Or. Ca. 381, which states a mere rumor of
a decision by Mr. J. THomPsOli. Loose statements of that kind
are entitled to no consideration whatever. Principles contrary to
those laid down by the court below have been frequently asserted.
See authorities cited in Roscoe's Cr. Ev. 6th ed. 278, 806; see
also .People v. Bran8byi, 32 N. Y. 525 ; 2 Bishop Cr. L., § 1078,

§ 1080.
We are also of opinion that the proposition contained in the
request of prisoner's counsel, which we have quoted, was in several aspects of the case correct, and that the jury should have been
instructed accordingly: Bex v. Jackson, 1 R. & R. 487 ; Regina
v. Clarke, 29 Eng. L. & Eq. 542; Commonwealth v. .Field, 4
Leigh 648; Roscoe's Or. Ev. 806; 2 R. S. 636, § 22.
The judgment, therefore, must be reversed, and as the evidence

WALTER v, THE BEOPLE.

makes out no offence against the prisoner, he is absolutely discharged: 2 R. S. 741, § 24, 4th ed. ; 3 R. S. 1025, § 26, 5th ed.
In The People v. Cornwell, 5 Am. C. B., says: "No evidence was given
Law Register N. S. 339, a very care- on behalf of the Crown that what was
fully considered case which appears to done to the girl was against her will or
have escaped the notice of counsel in without her consent. We are all of
the foregoing case, Justice COOLEY, of opinion that some evidence of that kii.d
the Supreme Court of Michigan, after a ought to have been given, and that in
review of the cases in England and its absence there was no case to go to
America, says "these cases clearly im- the jury. For myself I may add that
ply that the same circumstances must in my opinion the act which makes the
exist to constitute rape in the case of an carnal knowledge of a girl of tender
idiotic or insane woman as where the years penal throws some light upon this
woman is of sound mind. The word case. A girl of tender years is incawill, as employed in defining the crime pable of consenting; and therefore if
of rape, is not construed as implying mere incapacity to- consent were suffithe faculty of mind by which an intelli- cient to constitute the crime of rape,
gent choice is made between objects, that part of the act would have been
but rather as synonymous with inclina- unnecessary." The conviction was action or desire; and in that sense it is cordingly quashed.
used with propriety in reference to perWe may therefore take the language
sons of unsound mind. We are aware of Lord CAmPBELL, in Regina v. Richard
of no adjudged case which will justify *Re-cher, 28 Law Journal Rep. M. C. 85,
us in construing the words ' against her that "1to constitute rape it is not neceswill' as equivalent in meaning to ' with- sary that the connection with thewoman
out her intelligent assent,' nor do we should be against her will, itis sufficient
think that sound reason will sanction if'it be without her consent," to mean
it."
without her willingness or desire, wheThis view substantially agrees with ther that willingness be the result of
the latest and most authoritative expo- mere animal passion or the exercise of
sition of the law in England. *In Re- an intelligent volition.
Whether fraud in any case will be
gina v. Charles Ketcher, Law Reports
1 Crown Cases Res. 39, there was no equivalent to force, or in other words;
evidence as to the circumstances under whether where consent is procured by
which the connection took place. The fraud the consent shall be held void,
fact however was admitted and the de- and the degree of force requisite in
fence was consent. The girl was an having the intercourse shall be held
idiot with one side and one foot para- sufficient to- constitute rape, is a queslyzed. The defendant was convicted, tion upon which the authorities are not
and the judge reserved the question entirely agreed, either in England or
whether he should have allowed the America. The principal cases in both
case to go to- the jury, as there was no countries are cited in the foregoing case
evidence hut the fact of the connection and in People v. Cornwell, 5 Am. Law
and the imbecile state of the girl's mind. Reg. N. S. 339.
In delivering the judgment, Pozoc,
J. T. M.
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Supreme Court of -ennsylvania.
.CALDWELL AND WIFE v. BROWN ET AL.
A master is not liable to a servant for injury received through the negligence
of a fellow-servant.
This rule applies to the parents of a minor killed by negligence of a fellowservant.
Pkrsons in the same general employment, carrying out a common object under
one master, are fellow-servants, although they may be employed in different
branches of the occupation.
The measure of damages for the loss of a minor child by negligence, is the
pecuniary value of the child's services while under'age.

ERROR to Common Pleas of Armstrong county.

lzton, for plaintiff in error.
Golden & .Neale, and Boggs, for defendant in error.
The opinion of the court was delivered at Philadelphia, January
7th 1867, by
READ, J.-In Gilman v. Eastern Railroad Corporation,10
Allen 283, Judge GRAY said: "The case presented by this report
is to be determined by the application of rules now too well established to require an elaborate statement of the reasons on which
they are founded, or an extended examination of the authorities
by which they are supported.
"A servant, by entering into his master's service, assumes all
the risks of that service which the master cannot control, including
those arising from the negligence of his fellow-servants. In case
of an injury to one servant by the negligence of another, it is
immaterial whether he who causes, and he who sustains the injury,
are or are not engaged in the same or similar labor, or in positions
of equal grade or authority. If they are acting together, under
one master, in carrying out a common object, they are fellow-servants. The master, indeed, is bound to use ordinary care in providing suitable structures, engines, tools and apparatus, and in
selecting proper servants, and is liable to other servants in the
same employment if they are injured by his own neglect of duty.
But it makes no difference whether the maeter is an individual
or a corporation, in either case he is responsible to his servants for
his own negligence, but not for that of their fellow-servants."
The learned judge then cites the leading cases m his own state
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and in New York, and the authoritative decisions in the House of
Lords, as establishing this to be the law in England and Scotland
and in two of the great commercial states of our union.
There are two late cases in the Exchequer Chamber, decided
during 1865, affirming this doctrine in its fullest extent. In Hall
v. Johnson, 34 L. J. Exch. Ch. 222, 3 H. & C. 589, ERLE, C. J.,
said: "We take the principle to be established, from a series of
decisions in this empire and in America (decisions collected with
great skill and clearness by Mr. Mlanley Smith in his book on Master and Servant), that where a laborer is damaged by the negligence of a fellow-laborer the master is not responsible :" Smith
on MIaster and Servant, 2d ed., p. 134. And in Morgan v. Mhe
Yale of .Neath Railway Co., 85 L. J. Q. B. 23, 5 B. & S. 736,
on appeal from the Court of Queen's Bench, the same doctrine is
enunciated, by Lord Chief Justice ERLE, and Lord Chief Baron
POLLOcK delivering the unanimous opinion of the Exchequer
Chamber. In this case the case of Gilshannon v. The Stonybrook Railroad 0oryoration, 10 Cushing's Rep. 228, is cited at
some length, in a note. See also Bottomly v. Brooc&, August
1866, Nisi Prius,by LUSH, J., and MARTIN, B., 15 Law Times
Rep. N. S. 19 ; Warburton v. Great Western Railway Co., 15
*L. T. N. . 861, Exoh., decided 17th November 1866.
The same rule is laid down in all the late cases in the Court of
Appeals of New York: Coon v. Syracuse Railroad Co., 5 N..
Y. 492; Russellv. Hudson River Railroad Co., 17 N. Y. 134;
Sherman v. Syracuse J Rochester Railroad Co.*, Id. 153 ; Boldt
v. -N. Y. Central Railroad Co., 18 N. Y. 482; Wright v. Same,.
25 N. Y. 562.
And the commissioners of the Code, in their ninth report of the
Civil Code of the state of New York, p. 307, § 1006, embody these
authorities in that section: 1 An employer is not bound to indemnify the employee for losses suffered by the latter in consequence
of the ordinary risks of the business in which he is employed, norin consequence of the negligence of another person employed by
the same employer in the same general business, unless he has.
neglected to use ordinary care in the selection of the culpableemployee."
This is the rule in Pennsylvania, as in many other states:
Ryan v. Cumberland Valley Railroad.Co., 11 Harris 384; _Pra,zer v. Penna. Railroad 'o., 2 Wright 104 ; Catawissa.Railroad
VOL. XV.-48
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Co. v. Armstrong, 13 Wright 194; O'Donnell v. Allegheny
12ailroad Co., 14 Id. 490. See Hayden v. Smithville Manufactaring Co., 29 Conn. 557; Manville v. The Cleveland & Toledo
.RairoadCo., 11 Ohio, N. S. .417 ; .llinois CentralRailroad Co.
V. Cox, 21 Illinois 20 ; Moss v. Johnson, 22 Id. 633 ; Ohio
.Yfississippi Railroad Co. v. Tindall, 13 Indiana 366; Wilson v.
3fadison, &., Railroad Co., 18 Indiana 226.
The damages to be recovered in case of death by negligence are
the pecuniary loss sustained by the parties entitled to maintain
the action: Penna. Railroad Co. v. Zebe, 9 Casey 330; -Same
V. Vandsver, 12 Casey 298; Same v. Catharine Henderson, 1
P. F. Smith 815.
The first and fifth .errors assigned arise from a misconception
of the settled law of the land, that the master is not liable to an
employee for the negligence of a co-employee ; and, of course, that
the parents of the deceased have no cause of action against the
defendants for the loss of the services of their minor son upon that
ground.
The deceased was a minor son of the plaintiffs, and worked at
a large rolling-mill of the defendants, at a furnace assigned him,
in close proximity to the boiler which furnished the motive power
to run the nail factory. When the works started on the morning
of the 9th December 1862, Daniel, the decedent, was at his post,
as usual. They had gone, however, but a few minutes when this
boiler exploded with fearful noise and violence. Several persons
were injured, but'Daniel was the only one killed. This action was
brought against the owners of the mill by his parents. The first
ground alleged to entitle them to recover we have already disposed of.
There was clearly no error in the answer to the third point,
which is the first error assigned, nor in the answer to the fourth
point, which is the second error assigned. So in the fourth error
upon the subject of its being caused by the negligence of the party
killed, it is clear the court were right in saying if such were the
case there could be no recovery. The language quoted in this
assignment of error is a general statement of the law, in the opening of the charge ; but in justice to the court, the subsequent part
of it applying it to the case in hand should have been also stated.
" It has been faintly pressed by the defendants that the boy him
self was guilty of such rashness and negligence to his own safety
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as at least to bring him within the principle of concurring negligence in two particulars,"-the second of which was,-" that the
fire in the heating furnace of the nail factory was under the control
of the boy-was on that occasion excessive, and added to the
danger.
"As to the second, the jury will decide how the fact was. It
is probable that you may arrive at the conclusion that the fire in
the heating furnace had nothing, or very trifling effect in causing
the explosion. However, if you think you have evidence to satisfy
you that it was partially the cause, and that the boy was thus in
fault, plaintiff cannot recover. It seems to me the evidence is
very slight to warrant the conclusion, but it is left to the jury."
In all this, what have the plaintiffs to complain of ?
It was argued by the plaintiff that the knowledge and acts of
the manager or superintendent, were the knowledge and acts of
the defendants, and the court so instructed the jury, and of this
instruction no one except the defendants had any cause to complain. The court went, certainly, as far as they were asked to go,
although there are authorities which do not seem to warrant it.
In. Albro v. Agawam Canal Company, 6 Cush. 75, the proprietors of a manufacturing establishment were held not to be
responsible to an operative in.their employment for an injury
sustained by him in consequence of an accident occasioned by
the gross negligence and want of skill on the part of the superintendent of the works in a matter entirely under his control and
management-he being a fit and proper person, and both being
engaged in their proper duties at the time of. the accident:
and 'the superintendent himself was held not liable in Aibro v,
Jacquih, 4 Gray 99. In this. last case both are considered as
servants in the employment of the same master; in other words,
co-employees.
The same rule, in broader'terms, is laid down in Wiglit v. N.
Y. Central Railroad Co., 25 N. Y. 565, and above cited. "The
rule exempting the master is the same, although the grades of the
servants or employees are different, and the person injured is inferior in rank, and subject to the directions and general control of
him by whose act the injury is caused." "Personal negligence
(that of the master) is the gist of the action. It is not enough
that the foreman and general superintendent of the work is guilty
of negligence, causing injury to the subordinates."
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In Southeote v. Stanley, 1 H. & N. 247, Lord Chief Baron
POLLOOK said: "The rule applies to all the members of a domestic

establishment; so that the master is not in general liable to a servant for injury resulting fron the negligence of a fellow-servant;
neither can one servant maintain an action against another for
negligence, whilst engaged in their common employment.'
And in Morgan v. Trale of .Neath Railway Co., above cited,
the same learned judge said: "I am only desiros to add that it
appears to me that if we 'were to decide this case in favor of the
plaintiff we should open the gates to a flood of litigation. In
every large manufactory where a number of workmen are employed
in: different deppartments of the same business, we should have it
split up into any number of objects, although they all had the one
common purpose. Thus in one manufactory the making of screws
would be called one object and the doing woodwork another, and
so on, and then a person employed in a superior department would
be said to have nothing to do with the porter in the same establishment."
There was, therefore, no error of which the plaintiffs could complain, and that is all we need say on this point.
The third error is the answer to the plaintiff's tenth point, which
is in these words :-That the measure of damages is not to be confined simply to what wages the deceased might have earned. during his minority, but may also include the advantage of his society
and assistance at home, out of active hours; and also the contingency of his remaining at home and laboring for his parents after
he attained his majority, as well as the aid they might reasonably
expect from him in their old age, even if he were married.
The Court answering, say :-" This point is answered in the
•negative- It is the pecuniary value of the services of the boy
during his minority that can be recovered ;" and in the charge,-" If the jury find for plaintiff, the measure of damages is simply
the money value of the boy's services till he arrive at the age of
Plaintiffs are not to be allowed for the
twenty-one years.
agonized feelings of parents, nor loss of his society."
This is clearly the law, and a proper answer to the instruction
prayed for: Penna. Bailroad Co. v. Kelly, 7 Casey 372;
Same v. Zebe, 9 Id. 318; 13 Indiana 366.
The jury gave $200 damages, and we see no, error of which the
Judgment affirmed.
p!intiffs could complain.

HAL, v. MARTIN.

Supreme Court of New Hampshire.
HORACE J. HALL v. HIRAM MARTIN ET AL.
At common law the heir was liable on the covenants of his ancestor in which
he was specially bound, just so far, and no farther, as he had assets by descent;
and as real estate alone descended to him, his liability was limited to that.
But when, by the statute of New Hampshire, the personal estate is made to
descend to him, substantially in the same way, a correct application of the commonlaw principle requires it to be treated as assets in'his hands, equally with the real
estate; and it was therefore held that such heir is liable on the covenants of his
ancestor, which could not have been proved while the estate was in the course of
administration, to the extent of the personal, as well as the reat estate, which has
so descended to him.
Suits against an heir or devisee are not barred by the provisions of the Revised
Statutes-, ch. 161, §§ 5 and- 6, limiting actions against executors or administrators
of solvent estates, where no funds are retained for contingent claims by order bf
the judge ofprobate, to three years froni the original grant of administration.
But the limitation applies only to suits against the executor or administrator,
and therefore the remedy against the heir or devisee upon claims which could not
be proved during the' three years, because. contingent, is not'impaired by.these
provisions, but remains as in the case of insolvent 'estates.

THIS- was an action -for covenant broken on the covenants of '
deed made, by Moses Martin, the father of the defendants, to the
pIaintiff, in which deed he covdnanted for himself 'and his heirs.
In the declaration it was alleged that the defendants ".received
personal assets as heirs of theh said father, sufficient to perform
all the covenants of the aforesaid deed. .The 'defendants
demurred to the declaratip' and claimed judgment, for the reason'

that it did not appear- by the 'declaration that they received land
or real estate by descent. "'

Ladd,for plaintiff.
ifaywood, for defendants.

-

The opinion of the court was delivered by
BELLows, J.-At common law, lands in the hands of the debtor
himself, were not assets for the payment of debts, and creditors
could only reach the personal estate, and the profits of the real
estate ; but not the land itself.
Upon the death of the debtor, in case of intestacy, the land
descended to the heir, and the personal estate to the- executor;
and in respect to simple contract debts, the creditor could look
only to the personal estate, in the hands of the executor; while
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the creditor by specialty, in which the heir was named, could
reach the land itself in such heir's hands; but the heir was bound
no farther than he had assets by descent, and nothing was regarded
as assets but real estate, for iiothing else descended to him.
By will, however, the debtor might charge his lands with the
payment of his debts, or any-part of them, and, therefore, when,
by his covenant or bond, he expressly undertook to bind his heir
by a necessary implication, it was held to be a charge upon him
to the extent of the lands so descended to him; otherwise such
covenant or stipulation would have been wholly inoperative.
.By our law, both real and personal estate are made liable for
tihe payment of debts, both before .and after the death of the
debtor; although, in the bands of the administrator, the personal
esate is primarily liable.
So, too, the personal estate, equally with the real estate, goes
to, or descends to the heir, after the debts are paid, and we think
it is clearly the general policy of our law, that both descriptions
of property shall be assets for the payment of debts before and
after the death of the debtor; whether in the hands of the administrator or heir.
The question, then, is, whether the liability of the heir is limited
to the real estate which descends to him, by any authority that
ought to be regarded as decisive, in view of the changes of the
common law made by our legislation.
In the case of Huthinsa v. Stiles, 3 N. H. 404, the commonlaw liability of the heir was held to be suspended so long as the
remedy against the administrator existed, upon the ground that
by our laws, no assets passed to the heir, until the remedy against
the executor or administrator ceased to exist; and, that to hold
the heir liable when he had received no assets and might never
receive any, would be unreasonable and unjust. This conclusion
was reached, not because of any provision expressly suspending
the heir's liability, but because the ground upon which that liability
rested at common law, namely, that he had assets. by descent, was
for a, time removed.
When, therefore, by the provisions of our statutes, the common
law is so far changed that the personal property of the deceased
debtor descends to the heir'in the same manner as real estate, it
would be but a proper application .of the principle of Hutchinson
v. Stiles, to hold -the heir liable to the extent of whatever descends
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to him from his ancestor, which, by the policy of our law, may
justly be regarded as assets for the payment of the debts of the
deceased. The personal estate is, by our law, primarily charged
with such debts, and it is wholly inconsistent with its policy to
hold that on distributing that estate among the heirs, after paying
such claims as could be proved within the time limited for that
purpose, it should cease to be chargeable at all.
At common law the personal estate continued liable in the hands
of the executor or administrator, until all the claims were paid ;
and it would be a wide departure from the policy of that law to
provide for a distribution of such estate among the heirs, free
from all charge for debts not provable during the administration,
but becoming so afterward.
In the case of Ticknor v. H1arris, 14 N. H. 272, which was
a suit against devisees and legatees upon a covenant of the testator, our legislation upon this subject was examined, and it seems
to have been understood that the personal estate could be reached
only through the executor or administrator; PARKER, C. J., saying that "'no way seems to be provided for a creditor to reach a,
distributive share of the personal estate in the hands of the heirs,
where the suit against the administrator is taken away."
It will be seen, however, that this point did not arise, necessarily, in that case -nor does the language used indicate a full consideration of it ; or that it was intended as an authoritative decision
of that question. It was there held that the remedy against devisees existed under our .statutes, but that the proviso saving the
remedy against heirs and devisees did not reach legatees; upon
the ground that this saving clause created no new right, and,
therefore, as no action against the legatees could be maintained
before that statute, none can be since.
We are inclined, therefore, although with the highest respect
for the suggestion of Judge PARKER, to consider this as still an
open question in this state.
When the law provided for distributing among the heirs the
surplus of the personal estate remaining after paying such claims
as could be proved during the time, and in the methods pointed
out; and when it must have been obvious to every one that large
claims might afterwards accrue which could not before have been
proved; we think it a sound construction of these statutes to
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hold that, by 'a fair implication, the personal estate, which is
made thus to descend to the heir, must be regarded as assets for
the payment of such claims. It is true these statutes do not expressly in terms make the personal estate assets in the hands of
the heir; nor do they expressly suspend all remedy against the
heir while the real estate is in the hands of the administrator;
and yet by implication it is suspended, and rightfully too.
The principle of the common law clearly was that the heir
should be liable for specialty debts in which he was bound, just
to the extent of th~e assets which descended to him from the debtor,
and no farther.
Any provisions of our statutes which have the effect tb increase
or diminish what must substantially be regarded as assets, must,
upon the principle on which the common law rests, cause a corresponding increase or diminutioq of the heir's liability, and this
was the doctrine of Hutchinson v. tiles.
So, also, whatever descended to the heir from the debtor, by
the common law, was assets; and, therefore, when by our law
personal estate is made to descend to him, it must be regarded as
assets also.
The case of Ticeknor v. Harris decides that a suit cannot be
maintained against a legatee for the debt of the testator; but this
decision does not bear upon the question before us. At common
law the legatee was not bound; there was no attempt, by the
testator, to bind him, and no change has been madej by our statutes, that affect his relation to the creditors. In this respect the
legatee differs widely from the heir.
It may also be remarked that, in England, the liability of the
heir has been extended beyond what are strictly assets at common
law; as in the case of an equity of redemption in lands, Solley
v. Gower, 2 Vernon 61, where it was held that, although such
equity is not assets at law, because the estate is forfeited ; yet the
heir having a right in equity, that ought in equity to be liable to
satisfy a bond debt ; and if the heir has sold or released his equity
of redemption to prevent the creditors obtaining satisfaction of
their debts, the court will follow the money into the lands of the
heir or his executor. Here then is a case where the heir is held
liable for what at law is not assets, but which in justice and equity
ought to be applied to the payment of debts.
By the policy of our laws an equity of redemption is made legal

HALL v. MARTIN.

assets, and there would seem to be no reason to doubt that it might
be reached in the hands of the heir by a suit at law.
The term assets does not denote any particular species of property, but is said to come from the French word assez, which
means sufficient or enough; that is, enough means in the hands
of the heir to pay the debt; and we think that to refuse to include
among such property that which by our legislation is made to
descend to the heir, in addition to that which went to him at common law, would be an adherence to the letter rather than to the
spirit of the old law, and especially when, by the old law, the personal estate in the hands of the executor would continue liable.
In the case of the creditors of Sir Charles Cox, 3 P. Wins.
341, it was held that where a term of years was mortgaged, the
equity of redemption in the hands of the heir was-equitable assets,
and as such should go to the simple contract creditors equally with
the specialty creditors.
This rule of equity as to the distribution of assets among all
classes of creditors is adopted in NTew Hampshire, and, also in New
York and New Jersey and many other states; and even in England by the Statute of 3 and 4 Win. 4, c. 104, passed in August
1833, lands, of which a debtor dies seised, are made liable for his
debts of all classes,.although a preference is there given to debts
by specialty.
The policy of our law is to make no distinction; and also to
charge all kinds of property with the payment of the debts in the
hands of the executor for a limited time, and after that to be
distributed among the heirs, but still remaining liable for debts
not barred by express limitatios, and which could not before be
proved.
It has been suggested that in respect to solvent estates, at
least, claims of this sort are barred by the operation of sections
5 and 6 of ch. 161, Rev. St., which provide that no action shall
be commenced against an administrator after three years from the
original grant of administration, unless assets are retained by him
by order of the judge of probate; which may be done to pay demands not due, or depending on a contingency; and which are
filed in the Probate Court, unless the distributees give bonds to
pay such claims.
If this provision applied equally to estates settled
in the insolvent course, there would be more force in the suggestion, but
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such is not the fact; on the contrary, by sections 13 and 15 of
ch. 163, Rev. St., it is provided that claims that might be presented to the commissioners of insolvency, and allowed, and were
not, shall be for ever barred.; but that the remedy against the
heir or devisee upon any claim which could not be allowed because it depended upon a contingency, should not be barred by
any neglect to make such presentation.
When, therefore, we bear in mind that all estates may be settled in the insolvent course, whether actually insolvent or not,
this provision, saving the remedies against the heir and devisee,
must be regarded as strongly indicative of -the policy of the law
in reference to all estates, whether settled in the insolvent course
or not.
The difference between the two modes is merely formal, and
cannot affect the substantial justice of preserving the charge upon
the assets, after coming to the distributees, for all claims that
could not before be presented and allowed. In both modes the
assets$ both real and personal, are in the hands of. the administrator, to be distributed among such creditors as can prove their
claims, in the methods pointed out; and after that the surplus
is passed to the heirs, devisees, and legatees; and no further
suits or proceedings can be maintained against the administrator.
Under such circumstances, it is difficult to perceive any reason
for saving the remedies against the heir and devisee in the case
of insolvent estates, which does not apply with equal if nbt greater
force to solvent estates.
In respect to the latter, the limitation is of suits against the
administrator merely; and nothing is said of suits against the
heir or devisee ; and, therefore, as at common law, and the statute
of 3 and 4 William and Mary, the remedy against the heir existed
before our statutes upon this subject, the additions provided by
our statutes to the remedy against the administrator must be regarded as cumulative unless the contrary appear, either expressly
or by necessary implication: State v. Wilson, 43 N. H. 418;
Rez v. Bobiison, 2 Burr. 799; Bowen v. Lease, 5 Hill 226.
It is true that in the case of solvent estates there is no provision expressly saving the remedy against the heir and devisee, as
there is in respect to insolvent estates; but it will be observed
that in the latter case there is a provision which expressly bars
all claims which might have been presented to the commissioners,
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but were not; and the saving of the remedy against the heir and
devisee, is in the nature of a proviso ; while, in respect to solvent
estates, the provision is merely that no suit against the administrator shall be maintained.
Indeed, it may well deserve consideration, whether the saving
of the remedy against heirs and devisees by sect. 13, ch. 163 of
the Revised Statutes, may not apply to solvent as well as insolvent estates-the reason for it is obviously the same, and the
language of the provision is broad enough to include both;
although by reason of its reference to the presentation of claims
to the commissioners, there may be some ground for an inference
that insolvent estates were alone referred to. But however this
may be, we think it furnishes a strong argument against a construction of sect. 5 and 6 of ch. 161 of the Revised Statutes, that
should take away all remedy against heirs and devisees.
Again it is very clearly the policy of our -statutes to give to all
a reasonable opportunity to prove their claims, and to share in
the distribution of the assets; and with that view the' assets are
all placed in the hands of the executor or administrator and
opportunity given, during a limited time, to make proof of claims
and receive payment; and, therefore, the assets remaining are
distributed among the heirs and devisees and others entitled to
them; saving to such creditors as could not prove thei.r demands
during the time limited, for 'the reason that they *ere wholly
uncertain and contingent, their remedies against the heirs and
devisees.
Such are the general features and policy of our laws upon this
subject, and to justify a construction of any special provision that
would cut off all remedy upon a contract of indemnity or a covenant in a deed of land, would require a pretty clear, expression
of legislative intention, more so than any we find in the provisions
in question.
The cases are numerous where it would be practically impossible to make proof of claims while estates were in the course of
administration. Among these are covenants of warranty of title
to land where the breach'has arisen long after.the covenantee had
himself conveyed with warranty; contracts of indemnity where
the breach and the damages are both wholly uncertain; official
bonds of sheriffs and their deputies involving complicated questions of suretyship and otherwise ; individual liabilities of corpo-
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rators involving great difficulties in adjusting the claims against
each; and a great variety of other cases of a similar nature,
equally meritorious with those claims which were in a situation
to be proved while the estates were in the course of administra.
tion. And it would clearly be not only unjust, but contrary to
the policy both of the common law and our own statutes, that
these claims should be unpaid while there were sufficient means
left by the debtor to discharge them.
If it were to be conceded that the legislature possessed the conotitittional right to bar claims that could not be presented and
proved during the time limited, it would, nevertheless, be so repugnant to all notions of justice as to forbid such a construction
unless the intention was very clearly expressed.
If -the demands had not accrued until the expiration of the
limited time, a law which should cut off the remedy would in its
effect be the same as the destruction of the right, and such an
intention is not to be presumed. The cases of Cutter v. Emery,
Adm., 87 N. H. 567, and Walker v. CheeVer et al., 39.Id. 420,
have been referred to, but it will be perceived that they are both
suits against administrators which were barred by the express
terms of the statute ; but no question was raised as to the effect
upon suits against the heir and devisee, and therefore they are
not in point.
Upon these views, then, we are brought to the conclusion that
in respect to creditors who could not prove their claims, while the
assets were in the hands of the administrator or come into distribution for them, their remedies against the heirs and devisees are
not barred by any provisions respecting either solvent or insolvent
estates.
I
In the case before us, it is to be assumed that the cause of
action did not accrue to the plaintiff until it was too late to reach
the assets in the hands of the administrator; and the claim is one
sounding in damages and wholly unliquidated and uncertain.
Under such circumstances it would be palpablyunjust that the
heir should take the estate, all of which might be personal, free
of the plaintiff's claim. Nor do we think such a result would be
in accordance with the policy disclosed by our legislation.
With these views, there must be judgment for the plaintiff upon
the demurrer.
PERRY, C. J.; and BARTLETT, J., gave a dissenting opinion.

COMMONWE@ALTH v. O'HIARA.

District Court of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania.
COMMONWEALTH EX REL. MILLINGAR v. MICHAEL O'HARA.
The Bankrupt Act of 1867 suspends all action upon future cases arising under
the insolvent laws of this state, where the laws act upon the same subject-matter

and the same persons.
The Bankrupt Act suspends all proceedings under the Act of 12th July 1842,
for the abolishment of imprisonment for debt and the punishment of fraudulent
debtors, where the latter act operates on the same subject-matter and upon the

same persons as the former.
A warrant of arrest is not regularly issued, and cannot be enforced, under the

Act of 12th July 1842, pending a levy on the personal property of the defendant,
by virtue of afl.fa. in the sheriff's hands, issued on complainant's judgment, and
pending the attachment of defendant's effects in the possession of the garnishee, by

virtue of an execution-attachment issued on said judgment.

-

THIs was a proceeding by bench warrant, under the Act of
July 12th 1842 (to, abolish imprisonment for debt and to punish
fraudulent debtors), at the instance of James Millingar, a jud'ment-creditor of O'Hara & Robinson, against Michael O'Hara, a
member of the said firm. The affidavit of complainant, upon
which the warrant of arrest in this case was issued, set forth the
racovery of a judgment in this court, by the affiant against the'
firm of' O'Hara & Robinson, upon a bond in the penal sum of
$50,000, conditioned to indemnify him from his liability as
indorser of certain promissory notes, drawn by the said firm, to
the amount of $25,000-.$8500,of which notes, it is averred, had
become due and had been protested- for non-payment, and which
he had become liable to pay, and one of which, amounting to
82500, he had actually paid.
The affidavit charged that-the defendant bargained and sold a
large quantity of tools and other property of the firm, of the
value of $1500, for $400, and that he so disposed of the said
property with intent to defraud his creditors :
That he gave to his wife, or to some person in trust for her,
about $7000 of the moneys of the firm, with intent to defraud his
creditors:
That he removed out of the county certain property, to wit:
bank notes, United States treasury notes, drafts, and bills of
exchange, amounting in the whole to about $20,000, with intent
to defraud his creditors:
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That he has& property and money which he fraudulently conceals, and unjustly refuses to apply to the payment of affiant's
judgment:
That he had disposed of .a portion of his property and was
about to dispose of other portions of his property,.with intent to
defraud his creditors.
Upon the presentation of the affidavit, a warrant for the arrest
of the defendant was issued in accordance with the requirements
of the act, and he was thereupon arrested and brought before
Judge WILAMS for hearing; but, at his instance, the hearing

6f the case was adjourned to a subsequent day, upon his giving
b6nd, with surety, for his appearance at that time. At the
adjourned hearing his counsel moved to quash the warrant on two

gr6unds:
I. Because the Bankrupt Act of 2d March 1867 supersedes
alt proceedings under tha Act of 12th July 1842, where, as in
this case, the complainant's debt is provable under the Bankrupt
Act, and the defendant is amenable to its provisions.
II. The warrant was irregularly issued, and cannot be enforced
under the provisions if the Act of 12th July 1842, because at
the time the said warrant was issued there was a pending levy on
the personal property of the partnership, consisting of the materials, stock, manufactured ware, and merchandise of the said firm,
and upon the individual property of the defendant, embracing his
stock in the Pittsburgh and Connellsville Railroad Company, and
in the Allegheny Valley Railroad -Company, by virtue of a ft. fa.
issued -on complainant's judgment; and because all the moneys
and effects of the defendant in the possession of the Exchange
National Bank have been attached, by virtue of an attachment in
execution issued on said judgment and served upon the garnishee,
as appears by the said writs ancl the indorsement of the sheriff
thereon.
The motion was thereupon argued by counsel on both sides and
held under advisement, and the further hearing of the case
adjourned, upon the defendant's entering into a new bond, with
surety,. for his appearance.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
WILLIAMS, J.-In considering and determining the questions
raised by the defendant's motion, I have availed myself of the
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learning and judgment of my brethren-the President Judge of
this court, and the President and Associate Judges of the Court
of Common Pleas. At my request, and with the view of securing
uniformity of decision and practice under the act authorizing this
proceeding, they have investigated and considered the questions
with me, and the result is that we have unanimously come to the
following conclusions:
I. That the Bankrupt Act, as soon as it went into operation.
ipso facto suspended all action upon future cases arising under
the insolvent laws of this state, where the insolvent laws act upon
the same subject-matter and the same persons as the Bankrupt
Act.
I. That the Bankrupt Act suspends all proceedings under the
Act of 12th July 1842, where the latter act operates on the same
subject-matter and upon the same persons as the former.
III. That the Bankrupt Act operates upon the subject-matter
of the complaint in this case and upon the persons affected
thereby, and therefore it suspends the operation of the Act of
July 12th 1842, under which the warrant for the defendant's
arrest was issued.
IV. That even if this were not so, the warrant in this case was
not regularly issued, and cannot be enforced, under the provisions
of the Act of July 12th 1842, pending a levy on the personal
property of the partnership and the individual property of the
defendant, by virtue of the fi. fa. in' the sheriff's hands, issued
on complainant's judgment; and pending the attachment o'f
defendant's effects in the possession of the garnishee, by virtue
of the execution-attachment issued on said judgment.
V. That the warrant issued in this case must, therefore, be
quashed.
But before proceeding to make the order it may be proper to
give briefly the reasons in support of the conclusions to which we
have come.
I. The Constitution of the United States gives to Congress the
power to establish uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies
throughout the United States. How far this power supersedes
state legislation was at one time a matter of much discussion,
upon which judges differed in opinion. Some held that the
power in Congress is exclusive of that of the states; and, whether
exerted or not, it supersedes state legislation: Golden v. Prince,
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3 Wash. Circ. .Rep. 313. Others maintained that the power in
Congress is not exclusive, and that, when unexerted, the states
are at liberty to exercise it; and this opinion is now firmly established by judicial decisions: Sturgis v. Crowninshield,4 Wheat.
122; Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Id. 273. The well-settled doctrine
on the subject is that the powers granted to Congress are not exclusive of similar powers existing in the states, unless where the
Constitution has expressly in terms given an exclusive power to
Congress, or the exercisd of a like power is prohibited to the
states, or there is a direct repugnancy or incompatibility in the
exercise of it by the states. In all other cases the states retain
concurrent authority with Congress, except when the laws of the
states and of the Union are in direct and manifest collision on the
same subject, and then those of the Union, being the supreme law
of the land, are of paramount authority, and the state laws so far,
and so far only, as such incompatibility exists, must necessarily
yield. But in the case of concurrent powers, when once the
legislature of the Union has exercised its powers on a given subject, the state power over that same subject, which was before
concurrent, is by that exercise prohibited: 1 Kent's Com. 390-1.
This doctrine has been applied by the courts to the power of Congress on the subject of bankruptcies; and it has been held that
though the power in Congress is not exclusive of the statesi and
when unexerted the states are at liberty to exercise the power in
its full extent, unless so far as they are controlled by *otherconstitutional provisions; yet when Congress has acted upon the
subject, to the extent of the national legislation, the power of the
states is limited and controlled: 4 Wheat. 122; 12 Id. 273.
Let us then apply these principles to the question before us.
If the Bankrupt Act conflicts with the insolvent laws of this
state, the operation of the lAtter is suspended so long as the
bankrupt law continues in force. It is true that there is a wide
difference between the Bankrupt Act and our insolvent laws.
as respects the relief afforded to the debtor.; for, while the
bankrupt may be discharged from his debts, the insolvent
debtor is only discharged from imprisonment. And there are
marked differences in other respects. But these differences in
the scope and purpose of the acts,pand in the regulations contained therein, do not necessarily prevent the acts from conflicting with each other. On the contrary they may occasion the
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conflict. The line of partition between bankrupt and insolvent
laws is not so distinctly marked, as to enable any person to say
with positive precision, what belongs exclusively to the one and
not to the other class of laws. It is difficult to discriminate 4ith
accuracy between bankrupt and insolvent laws ; and therefore a
bankrupt law may contain those regulations which are generally
found in insolvent laws, and an insolvent law may contain those
which are common to a bankrupt law: 2 Kent's Com. 390. As
respects the laws in question: they both operate upon the same
subject-matter, and upon the same persons, and they provide in
some respects a different rule for the distribution of a debtor's
effects among his creditors. They are therefore in direct and
manifest collision with each other, and the laws of the state must
yield to the paramount authority of the national legislature.
And so the question was decided in Ex parte Lucius Eames, 2
Story Rep. 322, cited by defendant's counsel. It was there held
that the Bankrupt Law of 1841, upon going into operation in
February 1842, ipso facto suspended all action upon future cases
arising under the state insolvent laws, where the insolvent persons
were within the purview of the Bankrupt Law. In delivering
the opinion Judge STORY'said: " It appears to me that both systems cannot be in operation or apply at the same time to the same
persons; and where the state and national legislation upon the
same subject and the same persons come in conflict, the national
laws must prevail, and suspend the operation of the state laws.
This, as far as I know, has been the uniform doctrine maintained
in all the courts of the United States." And, after referring to
the different opinions expressed by the judges in the case of
Sturgis v. Urowninshield, 5 Wheat. 122, as to the question of
the exclusive power vested in Congress by the Constitution of the
United States to pass a Bankrupt Law, he says: "But all the
court were agreed that when Congress did pass a Bankrupt Act,
it was supreme, and that the state laws must yield to it and could
no longer operate upon persons or cases within the purview of
such act. * * * * * It seems to me, therefore," he adds,
" that nothing remains'upon which an argument can be founded,
that the insolvent laws of Massachusetts are not, as to persons
and cases within the purview of the Bankrupt Act, completely
suspended. Each system is to act upon the same subject-matter,
upon the same property, upon the same rights, and upon the same.
VOL. XV.-49
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persons-creditors as well as debtors. Both cannot go on together without direct and positive collision; and the moment that
the Bankrupt Act does or may operate upon the person or the
case, that moment it virtually-supersedes all state legislation."
And in the case of Gltriwold v-Pratt, 9 Metc. 16, it was subsequentlyheld by the Suprome Court of Massachusetts that while
the United States Bankrupt Act of 1841 was in force, proceedings
against a debtor, under the insolvent laws of the state, were unauthorized and void, if the debtor and his property were subject
to the operation of the Bankrupt Act, although no -proceedings
ider it were had against him. It was-conceded in that case,, as
it has been by -the complainant's counsel in this,,that the effect
of the Bankrupt Law was necessarily to suspend all state laws
with-whicli it came in conflict ; but it was contended there, as it
has been in this case, and as was ruled in Zeigenfuss's Case, 2
Iredell 463, that a state insolvent law may exist and operate with
full vigor, until the Bankrupt Law attaches itself upon the person

or property of the debtor, by proceedings instituted in bankraptcy ; and that no case of conflict can arise until after, the
'proceedings in bankruptcy have reached that state in which the
debtor has been judicially declared a bankrupt. But this position, however plausible it may appear at first view, cannot, as the
court say, be sustained. The right to proceed under the insolvent law of the state, the Bankrupt Law being in full force, must
be placed on a firmer basis than that of the failure of "the insolvent to apply to the District Court of the United: States for the
institution of proceedings in bankruptcy. If the proceedings
under the insolvent law are valid at all, they must be valid to the
extent of carrying out and perfecting such proceedings after they
have once been instituted. Such effect has always-been admitted
to attach to proceedings legally commenced before the Bankrupt
Law went into operation, but then pending. Sound principle
would require that, in all cases where proceedings could be legally
instituted,.they should have the legal capability of being perfected
and closed, under the state law. But under the view taken of
this question on all sides, and as conceded on the part of the
plaintiff, the proceedings under the state insolvent-law, by virtue
of which he claims the property in-controversy, might be wholly
superseded and rendered void, at the will of the insolvent debtor,
by filing his petition in bankruptcy, during any stage of the pro-
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ceedings under the insolvent law, before his assets should be
divided among his creditors.
There can be no' doubt, as it seems to me, both upon reason
and authority, that the present Bankrupt Act supersedes all local
laws acting upon the same rights and affecting the same persons
and the same property.
II. And for the like reasons the Bankrupt Act suspends all
proceedings under the Act of 1842, by virtue of which the warrant in this case was issued. The very matters charged in the
affidavit of complainant as a ground or cause for the arrest of the
defendant, constitute and are declared to be acts of bankruptcy
under the provisions of the 39th section of the act, and for which
an ample remedy is provided by the 40th section. By virtue of
the provisions of this latter section the creditor-, upon filing his
petition, may obtain an order on the debtor to appear in five days
from the service thereof and show cause why he should not be
adjudged a bankrupt; and the court may also, by its injunction,
restrain the debtor and any person, in the mean time, from making any transfer or disposition of the debtor's property, and from
any interference therewith; and if there is probable cause for
believing that the debtor is about to leave the district, or to
remove or conceal his goods and chattels, or his evidences of property, or make any fraudulent conveyance or disposition thereof,
the court may issue a warrant to the marshal of the district commanding him to arrest the alleged bankrupt, and him safely keep,
unless he shall give bail to the satisfaction of the court for his
appearance, from time to time, until the decision of the court
upon the petition, or the further order of the court; and forthwith to take possession provisionally of all the property and
effects of the debtor, and safely keep the same until the further
order of the court. The act, it will be seen, provides an ample
and effectual remedy for all the matters complained of and
charged against the defendant in this case. But the provisions
of the Act of 1842 are in direct conflict with the provisions of
the Bankrupt Act. The Act of 1842 provides for the discharge
of the defendant upon his paying the debt or demand with costs
of suit; or upon his giving security to pay the same with interest
within the time specified in the act; or upon his giving bond,
with sureties, that he will not remove or assign his property with
intent to defraud his creditors, or with a view to give a prefer-

COMMONWEALTH v. O'HARA.

ence to a creditor for an antecedent debt until the demand of the
complainant with costs shall be satisfied; or upon giving bond,
with sureties, to take the benefit of the insolvent laws. The
Bankrupt Act forbids all preferences, and sets them aside where
they are made for the purpose of giving one creditor an advantage over another; and, as we have seen, it suspends the operation of the insolvent laws. It is therefore clearly in conflict with
the Act of 1842, which recognises and makes provision for such
preferences, and is in some'respects a supplement to the insolvent
laws of the state.
IL. But, aside from the provisions of the Bankrupt Act, the
warrant is irregular and cannot be legally enforced. It was not
the intention of the legislature, in adopting the Act of 1842, to
authbrize the arrest and imprisonment of a debtor, as a civil
remedy in any case in which he could not be arrested and
imprisoned before the passage of the act. But pending a levy
on personal property by virtue of a ft. fa., the creditor, before
the passage of the act, could not subject his debtor to imprisonment on a ca. sa. And if he could not, how can it be said that,
by the provisions of the Act of 1842, the defendant in this case
cannot be arrested ? If the Act of 1842 had not been passed he
could not be arrested pending the levy on the ft. fa., and it is
only in a case where by the provisions of the act he cannot be
arrested, that a warrant can issue. But it is unnecessary to
spend time in the further discussion of the subject.- The question was decided by the District Court of Philadelphia in the
case of Neal v. Perry, 4 Penna. L. J. 410. It was there held,
in an able opinion delivered by the President Judge, that pending a levy on real estate, by virtue of a ft. fa., a warrant of
arrest, under the Act of the 12th of July 1842, cannot issue
against the defendant. If this be so, there is greater reason for
holding that such a warrant cannot issue, pending a levy on
personal property, by virtue of a ft. fa. in the hands of the
sheriff, which is regarded as satisfaction, for some purposes, by
the law as long as it subsists.
The motion of defendant's counsel is, therefore, sustained on
both grounds; and the warrant issued in his case is hereby
quashed.

